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Round-robin-differential-phase (RRDPS) quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol has attracted
intensive studies due to its distinct security characteristic, e.g., information leakage in RRDPS can
be bounded without learning error rate of key bits. Nevertheless, its implementation is still far
from practical due to the complication of its measurement device. Moreover, on the theoretical
side, its security is still not clear in view of optimal attack. Here, by observing a potential phase
randomization of the encoding states and its connection with eavesdropper’s ancilla, we develop a
theory to bound information leakage quite tightly and differently. Our theory is applicable for both
with and without monitoring signal disturbance scenarios, which is significant for the understanding
of RRDPS. Based on our novel security proof, the practicality and performance of RRDPS can be
both improved dramatically. Furthermore, we realize a proof-of-principle experiment up to 140
km fiber distance which is the longest achievable distance of RRDPS system until now, while the
original security proof predicts no secret key can be generated in our experiment. Our results pave
an avenue towards practical RRDPS.
∗ wshuang@ustc.edu.cn
† weich@ustc.edu.cn
I. INTRODUCTION
Unlike classical cryptography whose security relies on unproven mathematical assumptions, quantum key
distribution (QKD) [1, 2] can information-theoretically distribute secret key bits between distant peers (such
as Alice and Bob). According to quantum mechanics, any eavesdropping on quantum channel will inevitably
introduce signal disturbance, which implies that Alice and Bob can bound the information leakage for the
eavesdropper (Eve) through collecting the error rate of their raw key bits or some other parameters reflecting
the signal disturbance. For the well known BB84 [1] and Measurement-Device-Independent (MDI) [3] QKD
with decoy states [4–6], the error rate and counting yields are used to evaluate Eve’s information. In Coherent-
One-Way (COW) [7, 8] and Differential-Phase-Shift (DPS) [9, 10] protocols, the visibility of interference
plays the essential role to monitor information leakage. Device-Independent (DI) [11–13] QKD also needs
to observe the Bell inequality. MDI-QKD and DI-QKD feature their high security level in practice while
COW and DPS have compact and simple implementation. There have been great progresses on experimental
QKD, such as long distance distance QKD implementations [8, 14, 15], high key rate systems [16–19] and
demonstrations of QKD network [20–23]. Nevertheless, monitoring signal disturbance is indispensable for
almost all these QKD protocols and implementations.
Surprisingly, recently proposed round-robin-differential-phase-shift (RRDPS) [24] protocol is an exception.
In RRDPS protocol, Alice prepares a series of pulse trains, each consisting of L weak coherent pulses. The
pulses are individually modulated to random phases out of 0 and pi, and every L-pulse train can be handled
as a packet. Upon receiving these packets, Bob measures the phase shift between the i-th pulse and (i+r)-th
pulse of each packet, where r is randomly chosen from [1, L − 1] for each packet and i + r 6 L. Through
a simple and comprehensive security proof [24], it has been pointed out that Eve’s information on raw key
bits IAE is no larger than h2(N/(L− 1)), where N is the photon number of a packet. The main merit of the
RRDPS protocol is that IAE does not depend on error rate of key bits, and thus can be treated as a constant
experimentally. It’s obvious that the information leakage will be deeply suppressed and higher tolerance of
error rate is expected when L becomes large, which is the reason why a RRDPS experiment with large L
is important. It is worth noting that multi-dimensional QKD protocols [25] usually have higher tolerance
of error rate, especially the recently proposed Chau15 protocol [26] can tolerate up to 50% error rate in
principle. However, these protocols must run with monitoring signal disturbance.
There have been several successful demonstrations of this protocol with passive interferometers [27, 28]
and actively-selectable components [29, 30]. The longest achievable distance is around 90 km [30]. Albeit
great progresses on experiments of RRDPS protocol have been made, it’s still a great challenge to realize a
practical measurement system with large L value. Besides, large L value will decrease the secret key rate
per pulse obviously. Therefore, it is highly desired if IAE can be further lowered while L is maintained small.
Additionally, although IAE given in Ref.[24] does not depend on the error rate, theorists are still not clear
how does Eve’s attack introduce error bits, and if it is possible to use the error rate in RRDPS to improve
its performance. To address these issues, we first report a new theory to bound IAE greatly tighter than
before especially for small L values. Interestingly, error rate can be also taken into account in our method to
estimate IAE further tightly. Through numerical simulation, we show that with our theory, the performance
of the real-life RRDPS implementation can be improved dramatically. It is remarkable that the RRDPS
protocol with L = 3, which is not permitted in the original RRDPS protocol, can generate key bits now.
Finally, we verify our theory through a proof-of-principle experiment with L = 3, which achieves the longest
achievable distance (140 km) so far.
II. RESULTS
A. New bound for Eve’s information
The original security proof given in Ref.[24] is simple and beautiful, but does not exploit Eve’s optimal
attack and corresponding information leakage. Our basic idea is to directly construct Eve’s collective attack
and calculate the maximal information acquired by Eve. Then using a quantum defitti theorem [31–33], the
results are also against general coherent attacks. However, even for collective attack, it is not easy to analyze
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in the RRDPS protocol, since the dimension of Alice’s encoding state depends on L and may be very large.
For simplicity, we first consider the case that each packet contains only one photon. Alice randomly prepares
the single photon state |ψ〉 = ∑Li=1(−1)ki |i〉, where ki ∈ {0, 1} is Alice’s raw key bit, and |i〉(i ∈ {1, .., L})
represents that this single photon is in the i-th time-bin. Eve’s general collective attack can be given by
UEve|i〉|einitial〉 =
∑L
j=1 cij |j〉|eij〉, where the quantum state of Eve’s ancilla |eij〉 corresponds to that Eve
transforms |i〉 to |j〉 and sends |j〉 to Bob. In principle, Eve’s ancilla has L2 different states and thus is hard
to tackle. We develop a method to simplify Eve’s quantum state and calculate her information effectively.
The essential of our method is to introduce the phase randomization, which is simply bypassed in previous
works. Concretely speaking, consider the case that Bob has measured the incoming single photon with basis
|a〉 ± |b〉 successfully, and announced (a, b) publicly. Then Eve aims to guess ka + kb, it is evidently that
for any i 6= a, b the phase (−1)ki is completely random to Eve, which implies that some mixed components∣∣cia∣∣2|eia〉〈eia|+ ∣∣cib∣∣2|eib〉〈eib| (i 6= a, b) will emerge in the density matrix of Eve. These mixed components
are definitely useless for Eve, thus can be bypassed and simplify the security proof notably. Accordingly, we
find that IAE 6 max06x61ϕ((L−1)x, 1−x)/(L−1), where ϕ(x, y) = −x log2 x−y log2 y+(x+y) log2 (x+ y).
Besides, x can be related to the error rate E, thus this bound works for implementations both with and
without monitoring signal disturbance, which is quite meaningful for practical QKD systems. One can refer
to the supplementary file for a very detailed security proof.
It will be very useful to extend the single photon to N -photon case. Nevertheless, due to the complex-
ity of N -photon quantum state, it is apparently very hard to depict and calculate Eve’s information for
general N -photon case. Our technique is to group the N -photon state into different summations with dif-
ferent number of phases and introduce phase randomization between them. Here, we sketch our method
for the odd-N photon-number case. Such an odd-N photon quantum state must have the form |ψ〉 =∑N/2+1/2
n=1 (−1)ki1+...+ki2n−1 |i1...i2n−1〉, in which |i1...i2n−1〉 means a general state that the photon number
in time-bins i1...i2n−1 must be odd, while the photon numbers in all other time-bins must be even. Then it
is straightforward to redefine the collective attack with the new basis |i1...i2n−1〉: UEve|i1...i2n−1〉|einitial〉 =∑L
j=1 ci1...i2n−1j |j〉
∣∣eii1...i2n−1j〉. After Bob announces some (a, b) publicly, Eve will try to guess ka + kb.
Due to the potential phase randomization between different summations, Eve can acquire some informa-
tion only from two types of "two-dimensional" terms like UEve(−1)ki((−1)ka |i1a〉 + (−1)kb |i1b〉)|einitial〉
and UEve(−1)ki+kj (|ij〉 + (−1)ka+kb |ijab〉)|einitial〉. Summing over Eve’s information on all these "two-
dimensional" terms, we obtain the final formula to estimate Eve’s information. The detailed proof can be
found in supplementary file. The results are summarized by the following theorem and its corollary.
Theorem. For the RRDPS protocol with L-pulse packet, each packet containing N photon-number (L >
N + 1), Eve’s information can by bounded by
IAE 6Maxx1,x2,...,xN+1{
∑N
n=1 ϕ((L − n)xn, nxn+1)
L− 1 },
(1)
where, ϕ(x, y) = −x log2 x − y log2 y + (x + y) log2 (x + y), non-negative real parameters xi satisfying∑N+1
i=1 xi = 1. Moreover, if the error rate of raw key bits is E, these parameters xi must satisfy the
constraint
E >
∑(N−1)/2
n>1 (
√
(L− 2n)x2n −
√
2nx2n+1)
2 + (L−N − 1)xN+1/2
L− 1 for odd N ,
E >
∑N/2
n>1(
√
(L − 2n+ 1)x2n−1 −
√
(2n− 1)x2n)2 + (L−N − 1)xN+1/2
L− 1 for even N.
(2)
Corollary. If the photon number N 6 L− 2, IAE < 1 always holds.
Based on this theorem, the estimation of IAE is generalized to find the maximum value of a given function
under a constraint defined by E. This constraint can be simply bypassed, then we obtain IAE without
monitoring signal disturbance. Alternatively, if we retain this constraint, a tighter estimation of IAE may
be achieved. It is remarkable that searching such a maximum value can be effective and concise through
numerical method, since this function is convex. We also note that in Ref.[34], an improved estimation of
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IAE is also obtained. However, our bound is more tighter and does reveal the relation between information
leakage and signal disturbance.
B. Potential improvements made by our theory
We first compare the tolerance of E between the original RRDPS and our new formulae. In Tab.I,
under single photon case, the maximum tolerant error rates for RRDPS with conventional method and
the proposed formulae are given. One can see that our formulae can increase the tolerance of error rate
dramatically, especially when L is small. It’s remarkable to note that for the case L = 3, our bound can
tolerant E up to 8%, while the original RRDPS protocol can not generate secure key bits at all. One may
also note that the difference between these methods become little in large L cases. The reason is quite
simple, e.g., the original bound h2(1/(L− 1)) has been close to 0 for large L, so the potential improvement
made by our analyses will be very little.
TABLE I. The maximum value of tolerant error rate of RRDPS with different methods.
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
L
method
original RRDPS Eq.(1) without E Eq.(1) with E
3 – 0.0546 0.0811
5 0.0289 0.122 0.144
16 0.165 0.244 0.252
32 0.24 0.3 0.303
64 0.301 0.346 0.346
The most important thing is to compare the secret key rate and achievable distance between RRDPS
protocols with the proposed IAE and original one. Our simulation is based on the realization given in
Refs.[28, 29]. We simulate the secret key rates R per pulse versus total losses for L = 16, L = 32 and L = 64
without monitoring signal disturbance. In the simulation, we assume that dark counting rate d = 10−6 per
pulse and the optical misalignment parameter emis = 0.015 or 0.15, which are typical and realistic. The
detailed model used in simulation is given in the methods section.
Fig.1 (emis = 0.015) and Fig.2 (emis = 0.15) are both simulated without using signal disturbance param-
eters. From them we can see that with the help of the proposed method, the secret key rate and achievable
distance of RRDPS systems are both evidently increased, especially for small L cases. Although in low emis
case, the BB84 still overwhelms the proposed RRDPS in terms of key rate and achievable distance, the latter
one runs without monitoring signal disturbance, which is very meaningful for the postprocessing of QKD
systems. In high emis example, the proposed RRDPS outperforms the BB84 significantly.
We also simulate the RRDPS with monitoring signal disturbance in Fig.3, where we assume infinite decoy
states [4–6] are employed and emis = 0.015. The details of this simulation are given in the methods section.
With the error rate Ei for the key bits generated from i−photon packet, the key rates are dramatically
increased, especially for small L cases. One may note that the achievable distance seems to be almost same
for different L. Larger L is, higher error rate from dark counts of single photon detectors will be introduced.
Thus the achievable distance cannot increase unlimitedly through using larger L in practice. Meanwhile,
IAE is estimated very tightly, when the error rate is used. Based on the two points, the achievable distances
for different L in Fig.3 are very close.
Besides the numerical simulation, we borrow some experimental data to show the improvement of key
rate. In an experiment of RRDPS with L = 65 given in Ref.[29], the secret key rate for 95km fiber channel
can be increased from 5× 10−8 to 1.4× 10−6 per pulse (see methods section for details).
In conclusion, these simulations suggest that our theory can improve the performance of RRDPS protocol
distinctly for scenarios both with and without monitoring signal disturbance. Especially, in the applications
that optical interference is worse, i.e. high emis, our protocol overwhelms the commonly used BB84 protocol
evidently.
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FIG. 1. Secret key rate R versus channel loss: R1 and R2 represent for the original RRDPS protocol and the proposed
one respectively. RBB84 is for the BB84 protocol with infinite decoy states. Both R1 and R2 are simulated for the
scenarios without monitoring signal disturbance.
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FIG. 2. Secret key rate R versus channel loss: R1 and R2 represent for the original RRDPS protocol and the proposed
one respectively. RBB84 is not drawn since RBB84 = 0 in this case. Both R1 and R2 are simulated for the scenarios
without monitoring signal disturbance.
C. Proof-of-principle experiment
Based on the above theoretical results, the RRDPS requires that L > 3. From the view of experiment,
L = 3 corresponds to the most simple RRDPS realization. Here we make a proof-of-principle experiment
with L = 3 to verify our theory.
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FIG. 3. Secret key rate R versus channel loss: R1 represents for the original RRDPS protocol while R2 means the
proposed one with signal disturbance parameters. R2 is simulated with infinite decoy states.
Our implementation is shown in Fig.4, similar as [28, 29]. At Alice’s site, a pulse train with the repetition
rate of 1 GHz is generated by modulating a 1550.12 nm continuous wave (CW) laser using the first LiNbO3
intensity modulator (IM1). Every 3 pulses (L = 3) are defined as one packet. The second intensity modulator
(IM2) is employed to implement the decoy states method, by which each packet is randomly modulated into
signal, decoy and vacuum packets. The first phase modulator (PM1) adds phase −pi/2 or pi/2 on each pulse
to encode the key bits, and the second phase modulator (PM2) adds random global phase on each packet.
The encoded pulse train is then launched into a variable attenuator (VA) so that the average photon number
per pulse becomes the optimal value.
At Bob’s site, the passive scheme based on a 1× 2 beam splitter (BS) is used to implement a high-speed
and low-loss decoding measurement. Since L = 3 and the time interval between adjacent pulses is 1 ns,
there are only two unbalanced Faraday-Michelson interferometer (FMI) with 1 ns and 2 ns temporal delays.
One 50/50 BS and two Faraday mirrors (FM) constitute a FMI, and a three-port optical circulator is added
before the BS to export the other interference result. Each output of these two unbalanced FMIs is led to
a SPD. Finally, the detection events are recorded by a time-to-digital convertor (TDC), which records the
time-tagged and which-detector information.
The passive implementation scheme and small value of L and t make our RRDPS system very practical.
The passive approach can achieves high time efficiency and internal transmittance of Bob’s optical compo-
nents, and four SPDs used to detect the L = 3 packet is acceptable. The 1 × 2 BS amounts to randomly
choosing between 1 ns and 2 ns delay FMIs. Different from active schemes [29], the passive choice between
different delay measurements has no speed limits, and the time interval between each two packets to achieve
low error rate is not essential any more. The average insertion loss (IL) of the 1 ns and 2 ns delay FMIs is
only approximate 0.80 dB, where the IL of the optical circulator is also included. These two FMIs are placed
in two small ABS plastic cases to isolate them from the environment, and heating plates are used to keep the
temperature of FMIs above the room temperature. Thus, we could actively and independently compensate
the phase shifts of 1 ns and 2 ns delay FMIs, and also keep the phase of the unbalance interferometer stable.
Owing to 45◦ Faraday mirrors, these FMIs is insensitive to polarization variations, and features extinction
ratios of approximate 23.5 dB.
In addition, SPDs based on InGaAs/InP avalanche photodiodes (APD) are employed to detect photons
from 1 ns and 2 ns delay FMIs, which makes the RRDPS system more practical. These four SPDs are
working with Peltier cooling, and operated in gated Geiger mode with the sine-wave filtering method [35].
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FIG. 4. Experimental setup to implement RRDPS protocol with L = 3. CW: Continuous Wave; IM: Intensity
Modulator; PM: Phase Modulator; VA: Variable Attenuator.
The detection efficiencies of the four SPDs are approximately 20.4% with a dark count rate of 1.25 × 10−6
per gate and an after-pulse probability of 1.02%. Here, the insertion loss of the optical circular from BS (of
FMI) to SPD is included in the detection efficiency of SPD.
We tested the L = 3 RRDPS system with standard telecom fiber channels at the distance of 50 km, 100
km, and 140 km. The decoy states method was implemented by setting the photons per pulse of signal, decoy,
and "vacuum" packets with the value of 0.13, 0.03, and 0.0003, respectively. The experimental results are
listed in Tab.II, where the error rates of key bits and yields per packet are directly obtained experimentally.
Then we use formulae given in [36] to calculate the yield and error rate for single photon packet. Finally the
secret key rates R1 and R2 are calculated according to Eq.(1) without and with error rate respectively (see
methods section for detailed information).
For our L = 3 RRDPS experiment system, the transmission distance could reach 140 km with InGaAs/InP
SPDs, while the maximum transmission distance of the similar L = 5 RRDPS experiment system is less than
50 km with superconducting SPDs [28]. Thus, we have successfully verified the feasibility of RRDPS with
the smallest L = 3, which is impossible based on original theory. However, this proof-of-principle experiment
does not provide advantage over the commonly used QKD protocols, e.g. BB84 with decoy states, Indeed,
to obtain distance or rate advantage over BB84 and bypass decoy states, a larger L is necessary.
TABLE II. Experimental results of the L = 3 RRDPS system. List of mean yields and error rates of signal (Qs and
Es), decoy (Qd and Ed), and "vacuum" (Qv and Ev) packets, secure key rates per pulse (R1 and R2) for three lengths
of the fiber channel (l), where R1 is calculated without using error rate while R2 is based on monitoring error rate.
l(km) Qs Es Qd Ed Qv R1 R2
50 3.24× 10−3 1.76% 7.52× 10−4 1.95% 1.12× 10−5 8.14× 10−5 3.60× 10−4
100 3.28× 10−4 2.26% 7.86× 10−5 4.01% 4.50× 10−6 4.98× 10−6 3.15× 10−5
140 5.52× 10−5 4.99% 1.56× 10−5 13.31% 3.87× 10−6 – 1.45× 10−6
III. DISCUSSION
We develop a theory to estimate Eve’s information on raw key bits IAE in a quite different way. Briefly
speaking, the new physics behind our method is that the potential phase randomization can be utilized for
the security analysis of RRDPS. The main merit of our method is that IAE could be bounded more tightly
than before, especially when L is small. In theory, the relation between the information leakage and error
rate in RRDPS is present clearly, which is particularly meaningful for the completeness of security analysis
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of QKD. Our results can be used for scenarios both with and without monitoring signal disturbance. If
the error rate E is known, a more precise estimation of Eve’s information can be established. With the
help of our theory, the secret key rate and achievable distance of RRDPS are both improved greatly for
implementations both with and without monitoring signal disturbance. We also compare the RRDPS with
the commonly used BB84 protocol. In terms of secret key rate and achievable distance, the RRDPS may
not be better than BB84 when optical misalignment is low. Nevertheless, it can be run without monitoring
signal disturbance, thus to be useful in many applications. Moreover, when optical misalignment is high,
e.g. poor active phase compensation due to disturbance, RRDPS can outperform the BB84 significantly. To
verify our theory, a proof-of-principle experiment with L = 3 is demonstrated here.
Nevertheless, there are still several issues may be addressed in future. In Ref.[37], it has been proved that
the original bound IAE 6 h2(n/(L− 1)) holds with inaccurate phase coding. However, our technique deeply
depends on the phase randomization which requires that Alice’s phase coding must be 0 or pi randomly.
Therefore, analyzing the relation between phase coding inaccuracy and IAE quantitatively is necessary.
Another issue is how to countermeasure the potential attacks due to device imperfections. For example, the
blinding attack [38] must be carefully considered in the practical RRDPS systems.
Note added. While preparing the paper, we are aware that similar topics are discussed in theoretical works
[39, 40]. The methods used here are completely different from theirs. Compared to Ref.[39], our theory can
effectively estimate IAE without monitoring signal disturbance. As for [40], our results obtain a more tighter
bound of IAE .
IV. METHODS
A. Simulation
We use the Wolfram Mathematica 10.3 to run the numerical simulations. The models of the simulations
are given bellow.
Without monitoring signal disturbance. Assuming the mean photon number of each pulse prepared by
Alice to be µ, its mean photon number becomes ηµ after traveling through the channel with transmission
efficiency η. When Bob decides to set the delay value as r ∈ {1, ..., L − 1}, his photon number resolving
SPDs will open L− r time-windows to detect the incoming signal. Bob only retains the events that just one
single photon click occurs among these L − r time-windows. Here we assume that all loss stems from the
channel while the photon-number resolving SPD have 100% efficiency and dark counting rate d per pulse.
Accordingly, we obtain the counting rate with delay value r
Qr = (1− d)2(L−r)−1e−(L−r)ηµ((L − r)ηµ + 2(L− r)d), (3)
and the overall counting rate Q =
∑L−1
r=1 Qr/(L− 1). The error rate E can be simulated by
EQ =
L−1∑
r=1
1
L− 1(1− d)
2(L−r)−1e−(L−r)ηµ((L − r)ηµemis + (L− r)d). (4)
In the case without monitoring signal disturbance and decoy states, the secret key rate R per pulse is given
by
RL = Q(1− h2(E)) − esrc − (Q− esrc)IAE , (5)
where, esrc = 1−
∑vth
i=0 e
−Lµ(Lµ)i/i! is the probability of the photon number of a packet is larger than νth,
h2 is the information entropy function. In our method IAE is calculated by Eq.(1) setting N = vth and
ignoring constraint Eq.(2). In the original method, IAE = h2(vth/(L − 1)). µ and vth should be optimized
to achieve the maximum R.
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With monitoring signal disturbance. When signal-disturbance-monitoring and infinite decoy states are
both active,
RL = Q(1− h2(E)) −
∑
i=1
e−Lµ
(Lµ)i
i!
YiIAEi, (6)
where Yi is the yield for i-photon trial, IAEi is Eve’s information for the key bit generated by i-photon trial.
In our method IAEi is calculated by Eq.(1) setting N = i and constraint given by Eq.(2). Note that we set
IAEi = 1 for i > L− 1.
In this case, we first simulate the probability that Bob obtains one raw key bit per i-photon packet with
delay value r, which is
Yir = (1− L− r
L
η)i−1(1− d)2(L−r)−1(L− r
L
iη + (1− L− r
L
η)2(L− r)d). (7)
And the error rate of key bit generated by i-photon packet with delay value r is
EirYir = (1− L− r
L
η)i−1(1 − d)2(L−r)−1(L− r
L
iηemis + (1− L− r
L
η)(L − r)d), (8)
where, emis represents the probability that the incoming photon clicks the erroneous SPD due to optical
misalignment. Accordingly, the mean yield of an i-photon packet is Yi =
∑L−1
r=1 Yir/(L− 1), its mean error
rate is simulated by EiYi =
∑L−1
r=1 EirYir/(L − 1). Now we are ready to simulate RRDPS with monitoring
signal disturbance.
Simulation of BB84. For the purpose of comparison, we also simulate phase-coding BB84 with infinite
decoy states here. For BB84,
Yi = (1 − 1
2
η)i−1(1− d)(1
2
iη + (1− 1
2
η)2d),
EiYi = (1− 1
2
η)i−1(1− d)(1
2
iηemis + (1 − 1
2
η)d).
(9)
And its key rate is
2R = −Qh2(E) + e−2µ2µY1(1− h2(E1)). (10)
Calculations for an existing experiment. In an experiment of RRDPS with L = 65 given in Ref.[29], there is
a set of experimental observations: the mean photon number s = 0.037 per pulse, the yield Qs = 8.435×10−4
per packet and error rate E = 0.058. By setting vth = 10, the secret key rate is R1 = (Qs(1 − 1.1h2(E)) −
esrc−(Qs−esrc)h2(vth/64))/L = 5×10−8. With the same parameters and finding IAE = 0.513 for 10-photon,
R2 = (Qs(1 − 1.1h2(E))− esrc − (Qs − esrc)IAE)/L = 1.44× 10−6.
B. Key rate for the experiment
Here we give the methods how to get the secret key rates in Tab.II. The photons per pulse of signal , decoy,
and "vacuum" packets are setting with the values of s = 0.13, d = 0.03, and v = 0.0003 respectively. In
experiment, we directly observe the yieldsQs, Qd andQv for signal, decoy and "vacuum" packets respectively.
The error rate Es (Ed) for key bits generated from signal (decoy) packets are also observed experimentally.
Refer to Ref.[36], we can estimate the yield Y1 for packets with single photon and the error rate E1 for key
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bits generated from single photon packets by the followings:
Y0 = max{LdQve
Lv − LvQdeLd
Ld− Lv , 0}
Y1 =
Ls
LsLd− LsLv − (Ld)2 + (Lv)2 (Qde
d −Qvev − (Ld)
2 − (Lv)2
(Ls)2
(Qse
s − Y0)),
E1 =
EsQse
Ls − EdQdeLd
(Ls− Ld)Y1 .
(11)
As a proof-of-principle experiment, the secret key rates R1 and R2 in Tab.II are not obtained by actually
performing post-processing steps. Instead, they are calculated by R = (Lse−LsY1(1− IAE)−Qsh2(Es))/L.
Here, to obtain R1 we calculate IAE with Eq.(1) ignoring constraint Eq.(2). To R2, this constraint with
E = E1 is used.
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VI. SUPPLEMENTARY FILE: DETAILED SECURITY PROOF
A. Single photon case
Alice randomly prepares the single photon state |ψ〉 = ∑Li=1(−1)ki |i〉, where ki ∈ {0, 1} is Alice’s raw
key bit, and |i〉(i ∈ {1, .., L}) represents that a single photon is in the i-th time-bin. Eve’s general collective
attack can be given by:
UEve|i〉|e00〉 =
L∑
j=1
cij |j〉|eij〉 (12)
where, |eij〉 is the quantum state of Eve’s ancilla. Without loss of generality, we assume cij > 0 and∑L
j=1 c
2
ij 6 1, where the reason of setting
∑L
j=1 c
2
ij 6 1 is that Eve may introduce vacuum state. For each
trial, Eve only retains her ancilla |eij〉 to obtain maximum information on key bits.
In RRDPS protocol, Bob measures the phase shift between |i〉 and |j〉 of the incoming single photon
states. If Bob projects the incoming single photon states into (|a〉 ± |b〉)/√2 successfully, he will announce
{a, b}(a < b) to Alice, who will calculate ka ⊕ kb as her sifted key. The evolution of quantum state will be
|ψ〉|e00〉 −→(−1)ka(c˜aa|a〉+ c˜ab|b〉) + (−1)kb(c˜bb|b〉+ c˜ba|a〉)
+
∑
i6=a,b
(−1)ki(c˜ia|a〉+ c˜ib|b〉), (13)
where, c˜ij , cij |eij〉.
The density matrix (non-normallized) of Eve’s ancilla will be
ρE = P{ 1√
2
(〈a|+ 〈b|)UEve|φ〉|e00〉}+ P{ 1√
2
(〈a| − 〈b|)UEve|φ〉|e00〉}
= P{
L∑
i=1
(−1)ki c˜ia}+ P{
L∑
i=1
(−1)ki c˜ib},
(14)
where P{|x〉} = |x〉〈x|. Eve aims to guess ka ⊕ kb after Bob reveals the values of a and b.
Next, we try to simplify Eve’s density matrix. Since ki(i 6= a, b) equals to 0, 1 randomly, the relative phase
between |eaa〉(|ebb〉) and |eia〉(|ebb〉), i 6= a, b, will be randomized. In other words, we have the following
consideration
ρE −→
∑
j 6=a,b
∑
kj=0,1
ρE
= P{(−1)ka c˜aa + (−1)kb c˜ba}+ P{(−1)kb c˜bb + (−1)ka c˜ab}
+
∑
i6=a,b
c2iaP{|eia〉}+ c2ibP{|eib〉}.
(15)
Based on the above equation, if ka + kb = 0, the density matrix (non-normalized) of Eve’s ancilla |e〉 will
be
ρ
(a,b)
0 = P{c˜aa + c˜ba}+ P{c˜bb + c˜ab}+
∑
i6=a,b
c2iaP{|eia〉}+ c2ibP{|eib〉}. (16)
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If ka + kb = 1, the density matrix of Eve’s ancilla |e〉 will be
ρ
(a,b)
1 = P{c˜aa − c˜ba}+ P{c˜bb − c˜ab}+
∑
i6=a,b
c2iaP{|eia〉}+ c2ibP{|eib〉}. (17)
Without compromising the security, we can assume that 〈eim|ejn〉 = δijδmn. Then, Eve’s information on
ka ⊕ kb is given by the Holevo bound [41], which is
Q(a,b)I
(a,b)
AE = (c
2
aa + c
2
ba)S(

 c2aac2aa+c2ba 0
0
c2ba
c2aa+c
2
ba

) + (c2bb + c2ab)S(

 c2bbc2bb+c2ab 0
0
c2ab
c2
bb
+c2
ab

)
= ϕ(c2ba, c
2
aa) + ϕ(c
2
ab, c
2
bb),
(18)
where, Q(a,b) =
∑
i(c
2
ia + c
2
ib) is the yield for any a, b, ϕ(x
2, y2) = −x2 log2 x2 − y2 log2 y2 + (x2 +
y2) log2 (x
2 + y2). Thus Eve’s information on raw key bit is
IAE =
∑
a<bQ
(a,b)I
(a,b)
AE∑
a<bQ
(a,b)
=
∑
a<b ϕ(c
2
ba, c
2
aa) + ϕ(c
2
ab, c
2
bb)
(L − 1)∑i,j c2ij . (19)
Note that ϕ(x2, y2) is a concave function, then using the Jensen’s inequality, we have
∑
a<b
ϕ(c2ba, c
2
aa) + ϕ(c
2
ab, c
2
bb) ≤ ϕ(
∑
a<b
c2aa + c
2
bb,
∑
a<b
c2ba + c
2
ab)) = ϕ((L − 1)
∑
i
c2ii,
∑
i6=j
c2ij)
= ϕ((L − 1)x1, x2),
(20)
where, we define x1 =
∑
i c
2
ii and x2 =
∑
i6=j c
2
ij . Consequently, we have
IAE 6
ϕ((L − 1)x1, x2)
(L− 1)(x1 + x2) . (21)
By searching the maximum of above function with free non-negative variables x1 and x2 (x1 + x2 > 0), we
can obtain the maximal information leaked to Eve. Next, we try to bound IAE further tightly by finding
the relationship between x1 and x2.
Intuitively, the parameters x1 and x2 may depend on the error rate of the sifted key bit. In the following,
we try to introduce the error rate into the security proof of RRDPS protocol. According to Eq.(13), when
ka + kb = 0, the probability of Bob obtaining an error bit is
p(a,b)e =
1
2
[
∣∣c˜aa + c˜ba − c˜ab − c˜bb∣∣2 + ∑
i6=a,b
∣∣c˜ia − c˜ib∣∣2]. (22)
In the case that ka + kb = 1, the probability of Bob obtaining (|a〉+ |b〉)/
√
2 is
p′(a,b)e =
1
2
[
∣∣c˜aa − c˜ba + c˜ab − c˜bb∣∣2 + ∑
i6=a,b
∣∣c˜ia + c˜ib∣∣2]. (23)
We are ready to give the relation between error rate E(a,b) and cij , which is given by
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E(a,b) =
p
(a,b)
e + p
′(a,b)
e
Q(a,b)
=
∣∣c˜aa − c˜bb∣∣2 + ∣∣c˜ba − c˜ab∣∣2 +∑i6=a,b c2ia + c2ib
2(
∑
i c
2
ia + c
2
ib)
.
(24)
Furthermore, the error for all sifted key bits is
E =
∑
a<bQ
(a,b)E(a,b)∑
a,bQ
(a,b)
=
∑
a<b
∣∣c˜aa − c˜bb∣∣2 + ∣∣c˜ba − c˜ab∣∣2 +∑i6=a,b c2ia + c2ib
2
∑
a<b
∑
i(c
2
ia + c
2
ib)
>
∑
a<b
∑
i6=a,b c
2
ia + c
2
ib
2
∑
a<b
∑
i(c
2
ia + c
2
ib)
=
(L− 2)∑i6=j c2ij/2
(L− 1)(∑i c2ii +∑i6=j c2ij) =
(L− 2)x2/2
(L− 1)(x1 + x2) .
(25)
Thus, we have x2/(x1 + x2) 6 2(L− 1)E/(L− 2). In conclusion, with this relation, we can calculate a more
tighter bound of IAE with (21).
B. Two-photon case
Alice randomly prepares the two-photon state |ψ〉 =∑Li=1 |ii〉+√2∑16i<j6L(−1)ki+kj |ij〉, where ki, kj ∈
{0, 1} is Alice’s raw key bit, and |ij〉(i ∈ {1, .., L}) represents that there is one photon in the i-th and j-th
time-bins respectively. Similar to the single photon case, Eve’s general collective attack in two-photon case
can be given by:
UEve|ij〉|e000〉 =
L∑
l=1
cijl|l〉|eijl〉. (26)
When Bob projects the incoming single photon states into (|a〉 ± |b〉)/√2 successfully, the evolution of
quantum state will be
|ψ〉|e00〉 −→
∑
i
c˜iia|a〉+ c˜iib|b〉+ (−1)ka+kb
√
2(c˜aba|a〉+ c˜abb|b〉)
+
∑
i6=a,b
(−1)ki
√
2((−1)ka(c˜iaa|a〉+ c˜iab|b〉) + (−1)kb(c˜iba|a〉+ c˜ibb|b〉))
+
∑
i<j,i,j 6=a,b
√
2(−1)ki+kj (c˜ija|a〉+ c˜ijb|b〉).
(27)
For the ease of presentation, we denote cijl|eijl〉 as c˜ijl, and if i > j for some cijl, we should recognize it as
cjil. For
∑
i c˜iil, we further simplify it as c˜l. Clearly, as a result of the random phase (−1)ki , i 6= a, b, Eve’s
state collapses into a mixture state given by
ρ(a,b) =P{c˜a + (−1)ka+kb
√
2c˜aba}+ P{c˜b + (−1)ka+kb
√
2c˜abb}
+ 2
∑
i6=a,b
P{c˜iaa + (−1)ka+kb c˜iba}+ P{c˜ibb + (−1)ka+kb c˜iab}
+ 2
∑
i<j,i,j 6=a,b
P{c˜ija}+ P{c˜ijb}.
(28)
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Now based on very similar considerations in single photon case, we write Eve’s information as
Q(a,b)I
(a,b)
AE 6ϕ(
∣∣c˜a∣∣2 + ∣∣c˜b∣∣2, 2c2aba + 2c2abb) + ϕ(2 ∑
i6=a,b
c2iaa + c
2
ibb, 2
∑
i6=a,b
c2iba + c
2
iab). (29)
Furthermore, we have
IAE 6
∑
a<bQ
(a,b)I
(a,b)
AE∑
a<bQ
(a,b)
=
ϕ(
∑
a<b
∣∣c˜a∣∣2 + ∣∣c˜b∣∣2,∑a<b 2c2aba + 2c2abb) + ϕ(∑a<b 2∑i6=a,b c2iaa + c2ibb,∑a<b 2∑i6=a,b c2iba + c2iab)∑
a<b
∣∣c˜a∣∣2 + ∣∣c˜b∣∣2 + 2∑i<j c2ija + c2ijb
=
ϕ((L− 1)x1, x2) + ϕ((L − 2)x2, 2x3)
(L− 1)(x1 + x2 + x3) ,
(30)
where,
x1 ,
∑
i
∣∣c˜i∣∣2,
x2 ,
∑
a<b
2c2aba + 2c
2
abb,
x3 ,
∑
a<b
∑
i6=a,b
2c2abi.
(31)
Here, to obtain (30) we used the Jensen’s inequality and the following mathematical observations:∑
a<b
∣∣c˜a∣∣2 + ∣∣c˜b∣∣2 = (L− 1)x1,
∑
a<b
∑
i6=a,b
2c2iaa + 2c
2
ibb = (L− 2)x2,
∑
a<b
∑
i6=a,b
2c2iab + 2c
2
iba = 2x3,
(32)
hold for any non-negative array. Next we try to analyze the restrictions on x1, x2 and x3 with the help of
error rate E.
We return to Eq.(27), it’s straightforward to see that the probability for error key events from the first
row of Eq.(27) is
1
2
∑
a<b
∣∣c˜a − c˜b +√2(c˜aba − c˜abb)∣∣2 + ∣∣c˜a + c˜b −√2(c˜aba + c˜abb)∣∣2
>
∑
a<b
(
√∣∣c˜a∣∣2 + ∣∣c˜b∣∣2 −√2c2aba + 2c2abb)2
> (
√∑
a<b
∣∣c˜a∣∣2 + ∣∣c˜b∣∣2 −
√∑
a<b
2c2aba + 2c
2
abb)
2,
= (
√
(L− 1)x1 −√x2)2
(33)
where, we used the Cauchy-Schwartz inequality twice. And the probability for error-key events from the
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third row of Eq.(27) is
1
2
∑
a<b
∑
i,j 6=a,b
2(c2ija + c
2
ijb) =
(L− 3)x3
2
. (34)
Summing over the Eq.(33) and (34), dividing by
∑
a<bQ
(a,b), we have
E >
(
√
(L− 1)x1 −√x2)2 + (L− 3)x3/2
(L− 1)(x1 + x2 + x3) .
(35)
This ends the analyses on two-photon case.
C. Three-photon case
Alice randomly prepares the three-photon state
|ψ〉 =
L∑
i=1
(−1)ki(|iii〉+
√
3
∑
j 6=i
|ijj〉) +
√
6
∑
16i<j<l6L
(−1)ki+kj+kl |ijl〉, (36)
where ki, kj , kl ∈ {0, 1} are Alice’s raw key bit, and |ijl〉(i, j, l ∈ {1, .., L}) represents that there is one photon
in the i-th, j-th and l-th time-bins respectively. Similar to the single photon case, Eve’s general collective
attack in three-photon case can be given by:
UEve|ijl〉|e0000〉 =
L∑
t=1
cijlt|t〉|eijlt〉. (37)
When Bob projects the incoming single photon states into (|a〉 ± |b〉)/√2 successfully, the evolution of
quantum state will be
|ψ〉|e0000〉 −→(−1)ka(c˜aa|a〉+ c˜ab|b〉) + (−1)kb(c˜bb|b〉+ c˜ba|a〉)
+
∑
i6=a,b
(−1)ki(c˜ia|a〉+ c˜ib|b〉+
√
6(−1)ka+kb(c˜iaba|a〉+ c˜iabb|b〉))
+
∑
i,j 6=a,b
(−1)ki+kj
√
6((−1)ka(c˜ijaa|a〉+ c˜ijab|b〉) + (−1)kb(c˜ijba|a〉+ c˜ijbb|b〉))
+
∑
i,j,l 6=a,b
(−1)ki+kj+kl
√
6(c˜ijla|a〉+ c˜ijlb|b〉),
(38)
where, c˜ij , c˜iiij +
√
3
∑
t6=i c˜ittj , and c˜ijlt , cijlt|eijlt〉. We have observed that its first row and third row
have very similar same form with the evolution of single photon given by Eq.(13), while the second row has
the similar form with the first row of Eq.(27). Thus, analogous to the calculations in single photon and
two-photon cases, we have
IAE 6
∑
a<bQ
(a,b)I
(a,b)
AE∑
a<bQ
(a,b)
=
ϕ((L− 1)x1, x2) + ϕ((L − 2)x2, 2x3) + ϕ((L− 3)x3, 3x4)
(L− 1)(x1 + x2 + x3 + x4) ,
(39)
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where,
x1 ,
∑
i
∣∣c˜ii∣∣2,
x2 ,
∑
i6=j
∣∣c˜ij∣∣2,
x3 ,
∑
i<j<l
6c2ijli + 6c
2
ijlj + 6c
2
ijll,
x4 ,
∑
i<j<l
∑
t6=i,j,l
6c2ijlt.
(40)
Here, to obtain (39) we used the Jensen’s inequality and the following mathematical observations:∑
a<b
∣∣c˜aa∣∣2 + ∣∣c˜bb∣∣2 = (L− 1)x1,
∑
a<b
∑
i6=a,b
∣∣c˜ia∣∣2 + ∣∣c˜ib∣∣2 = (L− 2)x2,
∑
a<b
∑
i,j 6=a,b
6c2ijaa + 6c
2
ijbb = (L− 3)x3,
∑
a<b
∑
i6=a,b
6c2iaba + 6c
2
iabb = 2x3
∑
a<b
∑
i,j 6=a,b
6c2ijab + 6c
2
ijba = 3x4,
(41)
hold for any non-negative array. Next we try to analyze the restrictions on x1, x2 and x3 with the help of
error rate E. Based on similar method in last subsection, we have
E >
(
√
(L− 2)x2 −
√
2x3)
2 + (L− 4)x4/2
(L− 1)(x1 + x2 + x3 + x4) ,
(42)
where, we used Cauchy-Schwartz inequality and the following mathematical identity∑
a<b
∑
i<j<l,i,j,l 6=a,b
6c2ijla + 6c
2
ijlb = (L − 4)x4, (43)
always holds.
This ends the analyses on two-photon case.
D. Four-photon case
Alice randomly prepares the four-photon state
|ψ〉 =
L∑
i=1
|iiii〉+
∑
i<j
|iijj〉+ (−1)ki+kj (|ijjj〉+ |iiij〉+
∑
n6=i,j
|ijnn〉) +
∑
i<j<l<m
(−1)ki+kj+kl+km |ijlm〉,
(44)
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where we treat the efficiencies as part of quantum state, e.g., a|ijlm〉 is simply denoted by |ijlm〉. Similar
to the single photon case, Eve’s general collective attack in four-photon case can be given by:
UEve|ijlm〉|e00000〉 =
L∑
t=1
cijlmt|t〉|eijlmt〉. (45)
When Bob projects the incoming single photon states into (|a〉 ± |b〉)/√2 successfully, the evolution of
quantum state will be
|ψ〉|e00000〉 −→(c˜a|a〉+ c˜b|b〉) + (−1)ka+kb(c˜aba|a〉+ c˜abb|b〉)
+
∑
i6=a,b
(−1)ki(c˜iaa|a〉+ c˜iab|b〉+ (−1)ka+kb(c˜iba|a〉+ c˜ibb|b〉))
+
∑
i,j 6=a,b
(−1)ki+kj ((c˜ija|a〉+ c˜ijb|b〉) + (−1)ka+kb(c˜ijaba|a〉+ c˜ijabb|b〉))
+
∑
i,j,l 6=a,b
(−1)ki+kj+kl(c˜ijlaa|a〉+ c˜ijlab|b〉+ (−1)ka+kb(c˜ijlba|a〉+ c˜ijlbb|b〉))
+
∑
i,j,l,m 6=a,b
(−1)ki+kj+kl+km(c˜ijlma|a〉+ c˜ijlmb|b〉),
(46)
where, c˜t ,
∑L
i=1 c˜iiiit +
∑
i<j c˜iijjt ,c˜ijt , c˜ijjjt + c˜iiijt +
∑
n6=i,j c˜ijnnt,and c˜ijlmt = cijlmt|eijlmt〉. Clearly,
each row has the same pattern with evolution of two-photon case. Based on similar techniques used in last
three subsections, we have
IAE 6 =
ϕ((L − 1)x1, x2) + ϕ((L− 2)x2, 2x3) + ϕ((L − 3)x3, 3x4) + ϕ((L − 4)x4, 4x5)
(L− 1)(x1 + x2 + x3 + x4 + x5) , (47)
where,
x1 ,
∑
i
∣∣c˜i∣∣2,
x2 ,
∑
a<b
∣∣c˜aba∣∣2 + ∣∣c˜abb∣∣2,
x3 ,
∑
a<b
∑
i6=a,b
∣∣c˜abi∣∣2,
x4 ,
∑
i<j<l<m
c2ijlmi + c
2
ijlmj + c
2
ijlml + c
2
ijlmm,
x5 ,
∑
i<j<l<m
∑
t6=i,j,l,m
c2ijlmt.
(48)
And these parameters are constrained by the error rate E,
E >
(
√
(L− 1)x1 −√x2)2 + (
√
(L − 3)x3 −
√
3x4)
2 + (L− 5)x5/2
(L− 1)(x1 + x2 + x3 + x4 + x5) .
(49)
This ends the analyses on four-photon case.
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E. Odd photon-number case
Alice randomly prepares an encoding state like before, but the photon-number N is an odd number and
L > N + 1. It is clear that her encoding state has the form
|ψ〉 =
∑
i1
(−1)ki1 |i1〉+
∑
i1<i2<i3
(−1)ki1+ki2+ki3 |i1i2i3〉+
∑
i1<i2<i3<i4<i5
(−1)ki1+ki2+ki3+ki4+ki5 |i1i2i3i4i5〉
+ ...+
∑
i1<i2<i3<...<N
(−1)ki1+ki2+ki3+...+kiN |i1i2i3...iN〉,
(50)
i.e., it consists of n-phase (n = 1, 3, 5, ..., N) state, denoted by |i1i2..in〉. For example, |i1i2...in〉 represents
that the photon number in time-bins i1, i2,..., and in must be odd, while the photon numbers in all other
time-bins must be even. Eve’s general collective attack in this case can be given by:
UEve|i1i2..in〉|einitial〉 =
L∑
t=1
ci1i2..int|t〉|ei1i2..int〉 ,
L∑
t=1
c˜i1i2..int|t〉. (51)
When Bob projects the incoming single photon states into (|a〉 ± |b〉)/√2 successfully, the evolution of
quantum state will be
|ψ〉|einitial〉 −→(−1)ka(c˜aa + c˜ab) + (−1)kb(c˜ba + c˜bb)
+
∑
i1 6=a,b
(−1)i1(c˜i1a|a〉+ c˜i1b|b〉) + (−1)ka+kb(c˜i1aba|a〉+ c˜i1abb|b〉)
+
∑
i1i2 6=a,b
(−1)ki1+ki2 ((c˜i1i2aa|a〉+ c˜i1i2ab|b〉) + (−1)ka+kb(c˜i1i2ba|a〉+ c˜i1i2bb|b〉))
+ ...
+
∑
i1...iN−2 6=a,b
(−1)ki1+...+kiN−2 ((c˜i1...iN−2a|a〉+ c˜i1...iN−2b|b〉)
+ (−1)ka+kb(c˜i1...iN−2aba|a〉+ c˜i1...iN−2abb|b〉))
+
∑
i1...iN−1 6=a,b
(−1)ki1+ki2+..+kiN−1 ((c˜i1...iN−1aa|a〉+ c˜i1...iN−1ab|b〉)
+ (−1)ka+kb(c˜i1...iN−1ba|a〉+ c˜i1...iN−1bb|b〉))
+
∑
i1...iN 6=a,b
(−1)ki1+...+kiN (c˜i1...iNa|a〉+ c˜i1...iNb|b〉).
(52)
Evidently, for each summation we can calculate Eve’s information. Specifically, for the summations with the
global phase (−1)ki1+..+kin and n is odd, we obtain
Q(a,b)I
(a,b)
AE 6
∑
i1...in 6=a,b
ϕ(
∣∣c˜i1...ina∣∣2 + ∣∣c˜i1...inb∣∣2, ∣∣c˜i1...inaba∣∣2 + ∣∣c˜2i1...+inabb∣∣2). (53)
For the summations with the global phase (−1)ki1+..+kin and n is even, we obtain
Q(a,b)I
(a,b)
AE 6
∑
i1...in 6=a,b
ϕ(
∣∣c˜i1...inaa∣∣2 + ∣∣c˜i1...inbb∣∣2, ∣∣c˜i1...inab∣∣2 + ∣∣c˜2i1...+inba∣∣2). (54)
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Noting the following mathematical identities∑
a<b
∣∣c˜aa∣∣2 + ∣∣c˜bb∣∣2 = (L− 1)∑
i
∣∣c˜ii∣∣2,
∑
a<b
∣∣c˜ab∣∣2 + ∣∣c˜ba∣∣2 =∑
i6=j
∣∣c˜ij∣∣2,
∑
a<b
∑
i1...in 6=a,b
∣∣c˜i1...ina∣∣2 + ∣∣c˜i1...inb∣∣2 = (L− n− 1) ∑
i1...in
∑
t6=i1...in
∣∣c˜i1...int∣∣2,
∑
a<b
∑
i1...in 6=a,b
∣∣c˜i1...inaa∣∣2 + ∣∣c˜i1...inbb∣∣2 = (L− n− 1) ∑
i1...in+1
in+1∑
t=i1
ci1...in+1t,
∑
a<b
∑
i1...in+1 6=a,b
∣∣c˜i1...inba∣∣2 + ∣∣c˜i1...inab∣∣2 = (n+ 1) ∑
i1...in+1
∑
t6=i1...in+1
ci1...in+1t,
∑
a<b
∑
i1...in 6=a,b
∣∣c˜i1...inaba∣∣2 + ∣∣c˜i1...inabb∣∣2 = (n+ 1) ∑
i1...in+2
in+2∑
t=i1
ci1...in+2t.
(55)
And define
x1 ,
∑
i
∣∣c˜ii∣∣2,
x2 ,
∑
i6=j
∣∣c˜ij∣∣2,
xn ,
∑
i1...in
in∑
t=i1
∣∣c˜i1...int∣∣2,
xn+1 ,
∑
i1...in
∑
t6=i1...in
∣∣c˜i1...int∣∣2.
(56)
Combining Eqs.(53), (54), (55) and (56), we have∑
a<b
Q(a,b)I
(a,b)
AE 6ϕ((L− 1)x1, x2) + ϕ((L − 2)x2, 2x3) + ϕ((L− 3)x3, 3x4) + ...+ ϕ((L −N)xN , NxN+1).
(57)
Besides, with Eqs.(50), (51) and (56), it’s easy to verify
∑
a<bQ
(a,b) = (L − 1)(x1 + x2 + ... + xN+1). In
conclusion, Eve’s information is
IAE =
∑
a<bQ
(a,b)I
(a,b)
AE∑
a<bQ
(a,b)
6
∑N
n=1 ϕ((L− n)xn, nxn+1)
(L − 1)∑N+1n=1 xn . (58)
Through calculating the probabilities of error-key events corresponds to the n-th (n is even) row of Eq.(52),
we obtain that the error rate E must satisfy
E >
∑(N−1)/2
n>1 (
√
(L− 2n)x2n −
√
2nx2n+1)
2 + (L−N − 1)xN+1/2
(L− 1)∑N+1n=1 xn . (59)
This ends the security proof for odd photon-number case.
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F. Even photon-number case
Alice randomly prepares an encoding state like before, but the photon-number N is an even number and
L > N + 1. It is clear that her encoding state has the form
|ψ〉 =|i0〉+
∑
i1<i2
(−1)ki1+ki2 |i1i2〉+
∑
i1<i2<i3<i4
(−1)ki1+ki2+ki3+ki4 |i1i2i3i4〉
+ ...+
∑
i1<i2<i3<...<iN
(−1)ki1+ki2+ki3+...+kiN |i1i2i3...iN 〉,
(60)
i.e., it consists of n-phase (n = 0, 2, 4, ..., N) state, denoted by |i1i2..in〉. For example, |i1i2...in〉 represents
that the photon number in time-bins i1, i2,..., and in must be odd, while the photon numbers in all other
time-bins must be even. Eve’s general collective attack in this case can be given by:
UEve|i1i2..in〉|einitial〉 =
L∑
t=1
ci1i2..int|t〉|ei1i2..int〉 ,
L∑
t=1
c˜i1i2..int|t〉. (61)
When Bob projects the incoming single photon states into (|a〉 ± |b〉)/√2 successfully, the evolution of
quantum state will be
|ψ〉|einitial〉 −→(c˜i0a|a〉+ c˜i0b|b〉) + (−1)ka+kb(c˜aba|a〉+ c˜abb|b〉)
+
∑
i1 6=a,b
(−1)i1(c˜i1aa|a〉+ c˜i1ab|b〉) + (−1)ka+kb(c˜i1ba|a〉+ c˜i1bb|b〉)
+
∑
i1i2 6=a,b
(−1)ki1+ki2 ((c˜i1i2a|a〉+ c˜i1i2b|b〉) + (−1)ka+kb(c˜i1i2aba|a〉+ c˜i1i2abb|b〉))
+ ...
+
∑
i1...iN−2 6=a,b
(−1)ki1+...+kiN−2 ((c˜i1...iN−2a|a〉+ c˜i1...iN−2b|b〉)
+ (−1)ka+kb(c˜i1...iN−2aba|a〉+ c˜i1...iN−2abb|b〉))
+
∑
i1...iN−1 6=a,b
(−1)ki1+ki2+..+kiN−1 ((c˜i1...iN−1aa|a〉+ c˜i1...iN−1ab|b〉)
+ (−1)ka+kb(c˜i1...iN−1ba|a〉+ c˜i1...iN−1bb|b〉))
+
∑
i1...iN 6=a,b
(−1)ki1+...+kiN (c˜i1...iNa|a〉+ c˜i1...iNb|b〉).
(62)
Evidently, for each summation we can calculate Eve’s information. Specifically, for the summations with the
global phase (−1)ki1+..+kin and n is even, we obtain
Q(a,b)I
(a,b)
AE 6ϕ(
∣∣c˜i0a∣∣2 + ∣∣c˜i0b∣∣2, ∣∣c˜aba∣∣2 + ∣∣c˜2abb∣∣2)∑
i1...in 6=a,b
ϕ(
∣∣c˜i1...ina∣∣2 + ∣∣c˜i1...inb∣∣2, ∣∣c˜i1...inaba∣∣2 + ∣∣c˜2i1...+inabb∣∣2). (63)
For the summations with the global phase (−1)ki1+..+kin and n is odd, we obtain
Q(a,b)I
(a,b)
AE 6
∑
i1...in 6=a,b
ϕ(
∣∣c˜i1...inaa∣∣2 + ∣∣c˜i1...inbb∣∣2, ∣∣c˜i1...inab∣∣2 + ∣∣c˜2i1...+inba∣∣2). (64)
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Noting the following mathematical identities∑
a<b
∣∣c˜i0a∣∣2 + ∣∣c˜i0b∣∣2 = (L− 1)∑
j
∣∣c˜i0j∣∣2,
∑
a<b
∣∣c˜aba∣∣2 + ∣∣c˜abb∣∣2 = ∑
i1<i2
∣∣c˜i1i2i1 ∣∣2 + ∣∣c˜i1i2i2 ∣∣2,
∑
a<b
∑
i1...in 6=a,b
∣∣c˜i1...ina∣∣2 + ∣∣c˜i1...inb∣∣2 = (L− n− 1) ∑
i1...in
∑
t6=i1...in
∣∣c˜i1...int∣∣2,
∑
a<b
∑
i1...in 6=a,b
∣∣c˜i1...inaa∣∣2 + ∣∣c˜i1...inbb∣∣2 = (L− n− 1) ∑
i1...in+1
in+1∑
t=i1
ci1...in+1t,
∑
a<b
∑
i1...in+1 6=a,b
∣∣c˜i1...inba∣∣2 + ∣∣c˜i1...inab∣∣2 = (n+ 1) ∑
i1...in+1
∑
t6=i1...in+1
ci1...in+1t,
∑
a<b
∑
i1...in 6=a,b
∣∣c˜i1...inaba∣∣2 + ∣∣c˜i1...inabb∣∣2 = (n+ 1) ∑
i1...in+2
in+2∑
t=i1
ci1...in+2t.
(65)
And define
x1 ,
∑
j
∣∣c˜i0j∣∣2,
x2 ,
∑
i<j
∣∣c˜iji∣∣2 + ∣∣c˜ijj ∣∣2,
xn ,
∑
i1...in
in∑
t=i1
∣∣c˜i1...int∣∣2,
xn+1 ,
∑
i1...in
∑
t6=i1...in
∣∣c˜i1...int∣∣2.
(66)
Combining Eqs.(63), (64), (65) and (66), we have∑
a<b
Q(a,b)I
(a,b)
AE 6ϕ((L− 1)x1, x2) + ϕ((L − 2)x2, 2x3) + ϕ((L− 3)x3, 3x4) + ...+ ϕ((L −N)xN , NxN+1).
(67)
Besides, with Eqs.(60), (61) and (66), it’s easy to verify
∑
a<bQ
(a,b) = (L − 1)(x1 + x2 + ... + xN+1). In
conclusion, Eve’s information is
IAE =
∑
a<bQ
(a,b)I
(a,b)
AE∑
a<bQ
(a,b)
6
∑N
n=1 ϕ((L− n)xn, nxn+1)
(L − 1)∑N+1n=1 xn . (68)
Through calculating the probabilities of error-key events corresponds to the n-th (n is odd) row of Eq.(62),
we obtain that the error rate E must satisfy
E >
∑N/2
n>1(
√
(L− 2n+ 1)x2n−1 −
√
(2n− 1)x2n)2 + (L−N − 1)xN+1/2
(L− 1)∑N+1n=1 xn . (69)
This ends the security proof for even photon-number case.
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G. General N-photon case
We summarize and simplify the results given by the even photon-number and odd photon-number cases
here. For a RRDPS protocol with N photon-number source, packet size L and L > N +1, Eve’s information
can by bounded by
IAE 6
∑N
n=1 ϕ((L− n)xn, nxn+1)
L− 1 ,
(70)
where, ϕ(x, y) = −x log2 x − y log2 y + (x + y) log2 (x+ y), and non-negative real parameters xi satisfying∑N+1
i=1 xi = 1. If Alice and Bob make sure that their error rate is E, then the parameters will also satisfy
that:
if N is odd,
E >
∑(N−1)/2
n>1 (
√
(L− 2n)x2n −
√
2nx2n+1)
2 + (L −N − 1)xN+1/2
L− 1 ;
if N is even,
E >
∑N/2
n>1(
√
(L− 2n+ 1)x2n−1 −
√
(2n− 1)x2n)2 + (L−N − 1)xN+1/2
L− 1 .
(71)
Base one above results, a corollary is straightforward which is: for any N < L − 1, IAE < 1 holds. Lets
prove this corollary by reduction to absurdity. We consider IAE = 1 in case of N < L− 1. According to the
property of ϕ(x, y) function,
1 = IAE 6
∑N
n=1 ϕ((L − n)xn, nxn+1)
L− 1 6
∑N
n=1(L− n)xn + nxn+1
L− 1 =
∑N
n=1(L− 1)xn +NxN+1
L− 1
= 1− xN+1 + N
L− 1xN+1 = 1 +
N − (L − 1)
L− 1 xN+1.
(72)
Evidently, this suggests that xN+1 = 0, which leads to ϕ((L−N)xN , xN+1) = 0. Then Eq.(72) is rewritten
as
1 = IAE 6
∑N−1
n=1 ϕ((L − n)xn, nxn+1)
L− 1 6
∑N−1
n=1 (L − 1)xn +NxN
L− 1
= 1− xN + N − 1
L− 1 xN = 1 +
N − 1− (L− 1)
L− 1 xN ,
(73)
which implies xN = 0. Repeat above arguments for N times, we obtain that xn = 0(n = 2, 3, 4..) and
IAE = 0, which conflicts with IAE = 1. This ends the proof of this corollary.
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